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作者：Dellis, Arnaud
作者单位：University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal
摘要：Whom should an interest group lobby in a legislature? I develop a model of informational lobbying, in which a legislature must decide on the allocation of district-specific goods and projects. An interest group chooses to search and provide information on districts' valuations of the goods. The setting is one of dis-tributive politics, where the proposed allocation of goods and projects is endogenous to the information provided by the interest group. I characterize the information search strat...
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作者：Fu, Ruonan; Melenberg, Bertrand; Schweizer, Nikolaus
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：In this paper, we study asymptotic expansions for distorted probabilities under ambiguity, revisiting the framework and analysis of Izhakian (2020b). We argue that the first order terms in these expansions need to be corrected and provide alternatives. We also revisit later results in this paper on the separation of ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes. We argue that a crucial lemma is flawed implying that Izhakian's ambiguity measure (sic)(2) is not an equivalent way of representing the preferen...
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作者：Basak, Deepal
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：We consider the canonical frequent-offer Rubinstein bargaining game between two leaders on a policy issue. The public sentiment on this issue leans toward one leader or the other. Public sentiment determines the maximum compromise a leader can make without risking getting primaried. We introduce a positive probability.. that the leaders are uninformed about the sentiment. We show that a unique equilibrium emerges that resembles a war of attrition, in which one of the leaders may demand too muc...
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作者：Shende, Priyanka; Purohit, Manish
作者单位：Amazon.com; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects to agents when agents have strict preferences over objects. There are inherent trade-offs between competing notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives in such assignment mechanisms. It is, therefore, natural to consider mechanisms that satisfy two of these three properties in their strongest notions, while trying to improve on the third dimension. In this paper, we are motivated by the following question: Is there a strategy-proof a...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Panebianco, Fabrizio; Pin, Paolo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Siena; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their optimal action depends on an unknown state that is, actually, an aggregate of the actions of their neighbors. In each period, every agent chooses an action that maximizes her instantaneous subjective expected payoff and then updates her beliefs according to what she observes. In...
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作者：Borie, Dino
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We axiomatize the maxmin expected utility model in Savage's original framework, which does not re-quire a rich set of consequences nor objective probabilities. The key conditions in our result reformulate Gilboa-Schmeidler's (1989) Uncertainty Aversion and Certainty Independence for Savage's acts. Also, we propose a definition for comparative ambiguity aversion in this context. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kocherlakota, Narayana; Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Kocherlakota (1992) considers a deterministic economy with a finite number of immortal agents who trade a single asset subject to short-sales constraints. Proposition 4 shows that, in any equilibrium with a bubble, the present value of an agent's endowment is infinite if the agent's asset holdings do not converge over time to a limit. This note corrects an error in the proof of Proposition 4. (C) 2023 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies trade in endogenously evolving markets exhibiting few traders at any given point in time. Traders arrive in the market and bargain until they complete a trade. We find that, unlike large markets, small markets feature trade delay and price dispersion, even when sellers and buyers are homogeneous and matching frictions are small. We characterize transaction prices as a function of the endogenous evolution of the market composition and economic conditions, providing several no...
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作者：Cozzi, Guido
作者单位：University of St Gallen
摘要：Is growth ultimately fully endogenous or semi-endogenous? Three decades of theoretical and empirical growth economics have kept both possibilities open. Here, R&D-driven growth is a general combination of both semi-endogenous and fully endogenous mechanisms.I demonstrate that if the semi-endogenous growth component is indispensable to the actual growth mechanism, the long-run growth rate follows the semi-endogenous growth predictions. Conversely, if the semi-endogenous growth is non-essential ...
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作者：Jermann, Urban; Xiang, Haotian
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Peking University
摘要：The majority of bank liabilities are deposits typically not withdrawn for extended periods. We propose a dynamic model of banks in which depositors forecast banks' leverage and default decisions, and with-draw optimally by trading off current against future liquidity needs. Endogenous deposit maturity creates a time-varying dilution problem that has major effects on bank dynamics. Interest rate cuts produce delayed increases in bank risk which are stronger in low rate regimes. Deposit insuranc...
