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作者：Shishkin, Denis; Ortoleva, Pietro
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Princeton University; Princeton University
摘要：With standard models of updating under ambiguity, new information may increase the amount of relevant ambiguity: the set of beliefs may 'dilate.' We experimentally test one sharp case: agents bet on a risky urn and get information that is truthful or not based on the draw from an Ellsberg urn. With common models, the set of beliefs dilates, and the value of bets decreases for ambiguity-averse agents and increases for ambiguity-seeking ones. Instead, we find that the value of bets does not chan...
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作者：Bhaskar, V; Roketskiy, Nikita
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; University College London
摘要：We examine the ratchet effect under moral hazard and symmetric learning by worker and firm about new technology. Shirking increases the worker's future payoffs, since the firm overestimates job difficulty. Highpowered incentives to deter shirking induce the agent to over-work, since he can quit if the firm thinks the job is too easy. With continuous effort choices, no deterministic interior effort is implementable. We provide conditions under which randomized effort is implementable, so that a...
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作者：Gersbach, Hans; Jackson, Matthew O.; Muller, Philippe; Tejada, Oriol
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Stanford University; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Barcelona
摘要：We analyze two-party electoral competition with a one-dimensional policy space, costly policy changes, and random negative shocks to a party's viability over an infinite horizon. We show the existence and uniqueness of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in which parties use so-called simple strategies. Regard-less of the initial policy, party choices converge in the long run to a stochastic alternation between two policies, with transitions occurring if and only if parties suffer a negative ...
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作者：Deng, Shanglyu
作者单位：University of Macau
摘要：A speculator can take advantage of a procurement auction by acquiring items for sale before the auction. The accumulated market power can then be exercised in the auction and may lead to a large enough gain to cover the acquisition costs. I show that speculation always generates a positive expected profit in secondprice auctions but could be unprofitable in first-price auctions. In the case where speculation is profitable in first-price auctions, it is more profitable in second-price auctions....
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作者：Walker-Jones, David
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：This paper studies a new measure for the cost of learning that allows the different attributes of the options faced by an agent to differ in their associated learning costs. The new measure maintains the tractability of Shannon's classic measure but produces richer choice predictions and identifies a new form of informational bias significant for welfare and counterfactual analysis that is conducted with the multinomial logit model. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for optimal ...
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作者：Nezafat, Mahdi; Schroder, Mark
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business
摘要：In the standard perfectly competitive rational expectations model of information acquisition, the marginal benefit of private information to each trader is always positive. We show that with imperfect competition, characterized by a finite number of traders, the value of private information can be negative, resulting in a zero-information equilibrium even if information is free. This zero-information equilibrium arises when noise-trading volume is sufficiently large that price informativeness ...
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作者：Lichtig, Avi; Weksler, Ran
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Haifa
摘要：Does a better-informed sender transmit more accurate information in equilibrium? We show that, in a general class of voluntary disclosure games, unlike other strategic communication environments, the answer is positive. If the sender's evidence is more Blackwell informative, then the receiver's equilibrium utility increases. We apply our main result to show that an uninformed sender who chooses a test from a Blackwell -ordered set does so efficiently. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：del Mercato, Elena L.; Van-Quy Nguyen
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：We consider a pure exchange economy with consumption externalities in preferences. We use the notion of competitive equilibrium a la Nash. We provide the Social Redistribution assumption to restore the Second Welfare Theorem. We then introduce the differentiable characterizations of Social and Strong Redistribution. We show that all these conditions are weaker than other relevant assumptions studied in the literature. Our conditions entail interesting results on the decentralized implementatio...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Nehama, Ilan
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of Haifa
摘要：We examine the evolutionary basis for risk aversion with respect to aggregate risk. We study populations in which agents face choices between alternatives with different levels of aggregate risk. We show that the choices that maximize the long-run growth rate are induced by a heterogeneous population in which the least and most risk-averse agents are indifferent between facing an aggregate risk and obtaining its linear and harmonic mean for sure, respectively. Moreover, approximately optimal b...
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作者：Faro, Jose Heleno
作者单位：Insper
摘要：We propose the notion of replicas in the context of discrete choices and introduce axioms that charac-terize the Luce model with replicas. This model does not fall prey to the well-known red bus-blue bus example originally proposed by Debreu (1960) and later made famous by McFadden. Our model satisfies regularity, strong stochastic transitivity, and is a random utility model. Due to its simplicity, this model is more parsimonious than others aimed at overcoming the duplicates problem.(c) 2022 ...
