作者：Chen, Yi; Jungbauer, Thomas; Wang, Zhe
作者单位：Cornell University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We propose a model of strategic delegation in professional labor markets in which big and fringe firms compete for heterogeneous workers. In this context, big firms decide whether to exercise their market power to suppress wages (wage suppression) or to delegate hiring to divisions, thereby committing to bidding more fiercely for more skilled workers (talent acquisition). This reduces the incentive for other firms to go toe -to-toe with the decentralizing firm. In equilibrium, a big firm comma...
作者：Plan, Asaf
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper regards symmetry in games with more than two players. It is often said that a two-player game is symmetric if it looks the same to both players. However, there are n-player games, such as Salop's circle model, that seem intuitively to look the same to all players, but do not meet the common definition of a symmetric n-player game. This paper proposes a more general symmetry condition that is satisfied by such models. Previous authors have established that games which are symmetric i...
