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作者：Kim, Yonggyun
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：I study the value of information in monotone decision problems with potentially multidimensional action spaces. As a criterion for comparing information structures, I develop a condition called monotone quasigarbling, which involves adding reversely monotone noise to an existing information structure. Specifically, this noise is more likely to return a higher signal in a lower state and a lower signal in a higher state. I show that monotone quasi-garbling is a necessary and sufficient conditio...
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作者：Chen, Zengjing; Epstein, Larry G.; Zhang, Guodong
作者单位：Shandong University; McGill University; Shandong University
摘要：This paper studies a multi-armed bandit problem where the decision-maker is loss averse, in particular she is risk averse in the domain of gains and risk loving in the domain of losses. The focus is on large horizons. Consequences of loss aversion for asymptotic (large horizon) properties are derived in a number of analytical results. The analysis is based on a new central limit theorem for a set of measures under which conditional variances can vary in a largely unstructured history-dependent...
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作者：Tan, Teck Yong
作者单位：University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：This paper studies information design in an inspection game. A principal first privately decides whether to acquire a costly monitoring capability that is needed to detect shirking by an agent; subsequently, the agent decides whether to work or shirk. I show that overall efficiency can be improved by providing the agent with a partially - instead of fully - informative signal about the principal's decision; however, the resulting equilibrium involves the agent shirking with a positive probabil...
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作者：Shi, Shouyong
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：Many markets feature sequentially mixed search (SMS), which is search directed toward a price distribution followed by noisy matching with multiple offers. I construct a tractable model of SMS, establish existence of a unique equilibrium, and prove that the equilibrium is constrained efficient. Although individuals on each side of the market are homogeneous and search is directed, the equilibrium has a non-degenerate and continuous distribution of posted prices on a connected support. Despite ...
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作者：Bayer, Peter; Kozics, Gyorgy; Szoke, Nora Gabriella
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study public goods games played on networks with possibly non-reciprocal relationships between players. These include one-sided relationships, mutual but unequal relationships, and parasitism. It is known that many learning processes converge to the game's Nash equilibrium if interactions are reciprocal, but this is not true in general for directed networks. Under one-sided and parasitic relationships, best-response dynamics may cycle. The production of the locally public good of players ma...
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作者：Ascari, Guido; Mavroeidis, Sophocles; Mcclung, Nigel
作者单位：University of Pavia; European Central Bank; De Nederlandsche Bank NV; University of Oxford; Bank of Finland; University of Pavia
摘要：Standard rational expectations models with an occasionally binding zero lower bound constraint either admit no solutions (incoherence) or multiple solutions (incompleteness). This paper shows that deviations from full-information rational expectations mitigate concerns about incoherence and incompleteness. Mod-els with no rational expectations equilibria admit self-confirming equilibria involving the use of simple mis-specified forecasting models. Completeness and coherence are restored if exp...
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作者：Letina, Igor; Liu, Shuo; Netzer, Nick
作者单位：University of Bern; Peking University; University of Zurich
摘要：We consider the design of contests when the principal can choose both the prize profile and how the prizes are allocated as a function of a possibly noisy signal about the agents' efforts. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee optimality of a contest. Optimal contests have a minimally competitive prize profile and an intermediate degree of competitiveness in the contest success function. Whenever observation is not too noisy, the optimum can be achieved by an all-pay contest with a c...
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作者：Dasaratha, Krishna
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：Motivated by epidemics such as COVID-19, we study the spread of a contagious disease when behavior responds to the disease's prevalence. We extend the SIR epidemiological model to include endogenous meeting rates. Individuals benefit from economic activity, but activity involves interactions with potentially infected individuals. The main focus is a theoretical analysis of contagion dynamics and behavioral responses to changes in risk. We obtain a simple condition for when public-health interv...
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作者：Yang, Kai Hao; Zentefis, Alexander K.
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We consider the problem of how to regulate an oligopoly when firms have private information about their costs. In the environment, consumers make discrete choices over goods, and minimal structure is placed on the manner in which firms compete. In the optimal regulatory policy, firms compete on price margins, and based on firms' prices, the regulator charges them taxes or give them subsidies, and imposes on each firm a yardstick price cap that depends on the posted prices of competing firms. &...
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作者：Lanzara, Gianandrea; Santacesaria, Matteo
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Genoa
摘要：This paper proposes a spatial model with a realistic geography where a continuous distribution of agents (e.g., farmers) engages in economic interactions with one location from a finite set (e.g., cities). The spatial structure of the equilibrium consists of a tessellation, i.e., a partition of space into a collection of mutually exclusive market areas. After proving the existence of a unique equilibrium, we characterize how the location of borders and, in the case with mobile labor, the set o...
