Ambiguous information and dilation: An experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shishkin, Denis; Ortoleva, Pietro
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Princeton University; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105610
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Updating; Ambiguous information; ambiguity aversion; Ellsberg paradox; maxmin expected utility

摘要

With standard models of updating under ambiguity, new information may increase the amount of relevant ambiguity: the set of beliefs may 'dilate.' We experimentally test one sharp case: agents bet on a risky urn and get information that is truthful or not based on the draw from an Ellsberg urn. With common models, the set of beliefs dilates, and the value of bets decreases for ambiguity-averse agents and increases for ambiguity-seeking ones. Instead, we find that the value of bets does not change for ambiguity-averse individuals, while it increases substantially for ambiguity-seeking ones. We also test bets on ambiguous urns, in which case we find sizable reactions to ambiguous information. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses /by-nc-nd/4 0/).