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作者：Chan, Jimmy; Zhang, Wenzhang
作者单位：National Taiwan University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Zhejiang University
摘要：We study a T-period contracting game between a group of players without access to external financing. We show that the long-term efficiency loss is bounded from below by the need to vary incentives across self-evident events. When T is large, the efficiency bound can be approached by a contract that involves side payments between players. Our results apply to all monitoring structures and strategy profiles. They encompass the inefficiency result in Abreu et al. (1991), as well as the approxima...
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作者：Hori, Takeo; Im, Ryonghun
作者单位：Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology; Kwansei Gakuin University
摘要：Entrepreneurs are exposed to large uninsured risks, which may discourage them from creating productive assets. This may generate productive asset shortages and stimulate speculative demand for bubbles. This study introduces uninsured entrepreneurial risks into a textbook growth model with infinitely-lived agents. In the model, entrepreneurs face no credit constraints. If the degree of entrepreneurial risks is in the middle range, bubbles are likely to emerge. If the degree is high, bubbles pro...
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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Bossert, Walter
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universite de Montreal
摘要：In a world admitting a fixed finite set of alternatives, an opinion is an ordered pair of alternatives. Such a pair expresses the idea that one alternative is superior to another in some sense, and an opinion aggregator assigns an aggregate relation on the set of alternatives to every possible state of opinion. Our primary motivation is to extend the standard model of social choice theory to a more general one in which no specific reference to agents generating or holding opinions is needed. A...
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作者：Rocheteau, Guillaume; Wang, Lu
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：Is asset liquidity a source of price volatility? We answer this question within a continuous-time, New Monetarist economy under extrinsic uncertainty where the role of an asset to finance expenditure shocks depends on its pledgeability. If assets are intrinsically valuable and pledgeability is exogenous, then their prices are invariant to extrinsic uncertainty - unlike environments with discrete-time pricing that can feature sunspot equilibria. We derive conditions under which extrinsic uncert...
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作者：Mookherjee, Dilip; Tsumagari, Masatoshi
作者单位：Boston University; Keio University
摘要：We study regulatory mechanism design with collusion between a privately informed agent and a less well-informed supervisor, incorporating 'extortion' which permits redistribution of rents within the coalition. We show the Collusion Proof Principle holds, and that the allocation of bargaining power between the supervisor and agent matters. Specifically, the Principal does not benefit from hiring the supervisor if the latter has less bargaining power vis-a-vis the agent. We provide an example wh...
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作者：Andrei, Daniel; Carlin, Bruce I.
作者单位：McGill University; Rice University
摘要：We model a rent-seeking game where agents experiment with a new technology and compete for claims to a consumption stream. We characterize how creative destruction affects risk, wealth, and asset prices. Competition not only imposes excessive disruption risk on existing assets and higher technological uncer-tainty, it also increases the wealth duration (the weighted-average maturity of wealth). Because of hedging motives, a complementarity between wealth duration and technological uncertainty ...
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作者：Mayskaya, Tatiana; Nikandrova, Arina
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); City St Georges, University of London
摘要：A hider publicly commits to the number of seekers and then privately gets involved in a story, which may be compromising. Each seeker aims to be the first to learn and report a compromising story. The seekers learn the story privately and in continuous time. With more seekers, the hider's story gets revealed at a faster rate, but each seeker gets discouraged and ceases learning more quickly. To reduce the probability of a compromising report, the hider may optimally choose infinitely many seek...
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作者：Chen, Ying; Oliver, Atara
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：A principal (receiver) considers whether to accept a project whose total value depends on two aspects. In each period, an agent (sender) privately learns the value of one aspect with positive probability. We compare two common reporting protocols: frequent updating, which requires the sender to report in each period, and infrequent updating, which requires him to report only at the end of the learning process. The sender is biased towards acceptance; he may conceal his signal, but cannot other...
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作者：Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc; del Mercato, Elena L.; Siconolfi, Paolo
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：We study the existence of quasi-equilibria and equilibria for pure exchange economies with consump-tion externalities and Arrowian markets with personalized Lindahl prices. We provide examples showing first that quasi-equilibria and equilibria of the externality economy fail to exist under assumptions guaran-teeing existence for economies without externalities. We show that the externality economy has identical equilibrium allocations of an appropriately defined constant returns to scale produ...
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作者：Plantin, Guillaume
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：In an economy in which adjusting prices comes at a fixed menu cost, a baseline Taylor rule generates multiple equilibria with varying price rigidity, inflation, and real interest rate. Asset bubbles may be sustained as long as prices are rigid, they burst as inflation picks up and the real rate reverts to a long-term value at which bubbles are no longer sustainable. Unlike natural bubbles, these policy-induced bubbles once issued always crowd out investment by draining resources from the most ...
