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作者：Gan, Tan; Hu, Ju; Weng, Xi
作者单位：Yale University; Peking University; Peking University
摘要：This paper investigates a two-agent mechanism design problem without transfers, where the principal must decide one action for each agent. In our framework, agents only care about their own adaptation, and any deterministic dominant incentive compatible decision rule is equivalent to contingent delegation: the delegation set offered to one agent depends on the other's report. By contrast, the principal cares about both adaptation and coordination. We provide sufficient conditions under which c...
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作者：Govindan, Srihari; Laraki, Rida; Pahl, Lucas
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Liverpool; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2003) defined a Nash equilibrium of a finite game as sustainable if it can be made the unique Nash equilibrium of a game obtained by deleting/adding a subset of the strategies that are inferior replies to it. This paper proves a result about sustainable equilibria and uses it to provide a refinement as well. Our result concerns the Hofbauer-Myerson conjecture about the relationship between the sustainability of an equilibrium and its in...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Yang, Xiangqian
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Hunan University
摘要：We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private values. Assuming that the seller adopts the optimal auction due to Myerson (1981) in response, we characterize both the buyer-optimal information structure, which maximizes the buyers' surplus, and the seller-worst information structure, which minimizes the seller's revenue. We translate both information...
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作者：Tatur, Tymon
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper considers an evolutionary dynamic to study games played in large populations that consist of many identical, potentially small subpopulations, where individuals interact with others in their subpopulation, rarely moving between them. Since long-run behavior depends on the used mutation strategies, a criterion loosely inspired by Maynard Smith's (1972) notion of an evolutionary stable strategy is imposed on mutation strategies - we ask which mutation strategies are robust to invasion...
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作者：Evdokimov, Kirill S.
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：I study a distributive model of legislative bargaining in which the surplus generated by a winning coalition equals the sum of productivities of coalition members. The heterogeneous ability of players to generate surplus leads to asymmetric bargaining prospects in otherwise symmetric environments. More productive players are recruited more often by other players despite having higher expected payoffs; however, the players who are recruited in every coalition have equal expected payoffs despite...
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作者：Cai, Zhifeng; Dong, Feng
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Tsinghua University
摘要：This paper studies public information disclosure in a model of dynamic financial markets with endoge-nous information acquisition. Due to an information complementarity, multiple equilibria may emerge, complicating comparative statics analysis. By adding noise to agents' information costs, we establish equi-librium uniqueness using global-game techniques. We show that while public information always crowds out private information in all underlying equilibria, it can crowd in private informatio...
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作者：Liu, Bin; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore
摘要：We allow negative prizes and investigate effort-maximizing prize design in rank-order contests with incomplete information. Endogenous participation arises due to less-efficient types' incentive to avoid punishments. The optimum features winner-take-all for the best performer and at most one punishment for the worst performer among all potential contestants, whenever they enter the competition. Based on this, we then (1) provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of pure w...
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作者：Artige, Lionel; Cavenaile, Laurent
作者单位：University of Liege; University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University Toronto Scarborough; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper analyzes the relationship between public education spending, long-run growth and income inequality. We propose an endogenous growth model with occupational choice and an endogenous supply of teachers and education quality. We show that endogenous school quality alters the shape of those rela-tionships in a way that has new policy implications. First, growth depends on the level of public education expenditures and on the shape of the human capital distribution. Second, the relations...
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作者：Garrett, Daniel F.; Georgiadis, George; Smolin, Alex; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Essex; Northwestern University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper considers a moral hazard model with agent limited liability. Prior to interacting with the principal, the agent designs the production technology, which is a specification of his cost of generating each output distribution. After observing the production technology, the principal offers a payment scheme and then the agent chooses a distribution over outputs. We show that there is an optimal design involving only binary distributions (i.e., the cost of any other distribution is prohi...
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作者：Barlo, Mehmet; Dalkiran, Nuh Ayguen
作者单位：Sabanci University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：We investigate implementation under incomplete information allowing for individuals' choices featuring violations of rationality. Our primitives are individuals' interim choices that do not have to satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences. In this setting, we provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for behavioral implementation under incomplete information. We also introduce behavioral interim incentive Pareto efficiency and investigate its implementability under incomplete in...
