Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vida, Peter; Forges, Francoise
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE944
• 发表日期: 2013-01-01
• 页码: 95-123
• 关键词: Bayesian game; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; preplay communication

摘要

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.