Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ely, Jeffrey C.; Siegel, Ron
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE964
• 发表日期: 2013-09-01
• 页码: 801-827
• 关键词: Adverse selection; unraveling; interviews

摘要

We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker's value and interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with positive probability. When firms' interview decisions are revealed, severe adverse selection arises. As a result, all firms except for the highest-ranked firm are excluded from the hiring process.