Specialization and partisanship in committee search

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1292
• 发表日期: 2013-09-01
• 页码: 751-774
• 关键词: Committee search; asymmetric information; interdependent values; specialization; partisanship

摘要

A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alternative or to continue costly search. Each alternative is described by a vector of distinct attributes and each committee member can privately assess the quality of one attribute (her specialty). Preferences are heterogeneous and interdependent: each specialist values all attributes, but puts a higher weight on her specialty (partisanship). We study how acceptance standards and members' welfare vary with the amount of conflict within the committee. We also compare decisions made by committees that consist of specialized experts to decisions made by committees of generalists who can each assess all information available. The acceptance standard decreases (increases) in the degree of conflict when information is public (private). In both cases, welfare decreases in the level of conflict. Finally, we identify situations where specialized committee decisions yield Pareto improvements over specialized, one-person decisions and over committee decisions made by generalists.