Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, Drew; Kamada, Yuichiro
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1362
• 发表日期: 2015-09-01
• 页码: 775-806
• 关键词: Rationalizability; common knowledge; extensive-form games; self-confirming equilibrium

摘要

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady-state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.