Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1840
• 发表日期: 2015-09-01
• 页码: 853-865
• 关键词: Substitutability; matching; combinatorial auctions; matroids

摘要

We show that the class of preferences satisfying the gross substitutes condition of [Kelso and Crawford, 1982] is strictly larger than the class of endowed assignment valuations of [Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005], thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result implies that not every substitutable valuation function can be decomposed into a combination of unit-demand valuations.