Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sugaya, Takuo
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1425
• 发表日期: 2015-09-01
• 页码: 691-717
• 关键词: Repeated games; unequal discounting; imperfect monitoring; folk theorem

摘要

We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.