-
作者：Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
作者单位：University of Vienna; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies the adoption of nuclear magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) by US hospitals. I consider a timing game of new technology adoption. The dynamic game takes timing decisions and strategic interaction into account. Using a panel data set of US hospitals, cross sectional variation in adoption times, market structure and demand is exploited to recover the profit and cost parameters. In counterfactuals, I quantify to what extent the timing of adoption is caused by a preemptive motive. ...
-
作者：Ning, Z. Eddie
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：Some projects require collaboration between firms to implement. The expected return from such a project can change over time due to evolving market conditions or the arrival of new information. Each firm may also choose an outside option rather than collaborating. In such a case, when is the joint project implemented, and how do firms split the return? To address these questions, the paper studies a continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining with a stochastic cake and outside options. I sho...
-
作者：Doval, Laura; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Columbia University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：Product personalization opens the door to price discrimination. A rich product line allows firms to better tailor products to consumers' tastes, but the mere choice of a product carries valuable information about consumers that can be leveraged for price discrimination. We study this trade-off in an upstream - downstream model, where a consumer buys a good of variable quality upstream, followed by an indivisible good downstream. The downstream firm's use of the consumer's purchase history for ...
-
作者：Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian
作者单位：University of Munster; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf
摘要：To help households and firms with exploding energy costs in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, a new policy called the energy price brake was implemented. A unique feature of this relief measure is that it provides a transfer that increases in the consumer's contractual per-unit price of energy. In a formal model, we show that this policy creates incentives for moral hazard of energy providers to raise per-unit prices. Whereas this moral hazard problem increases the policy's fiscal costs, it al...
-
作者：Catonini, Emiliano; Stepanov, Sergey
作者单位：New York University; NYU Shanghai; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：A privately informed sender can commit to any disclosure policy toward a receiver, whose actions affect the utility of the sender. We show that full disclosure is optimal under a sufficient condition with some desirable properties. First, it speaks directly to the parties' utility functions, as opposed to the sender's indirect utility function; this makes it easily interpretable and verifiable. Second, it does not require the sender's payoff to be a function of the posterior mean state. Third,...
-
作者：Benatia, David; de Villemeur, etienne Billette
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Lille; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS)
摘要：This article investigates the incentives for firms with market power to manipulate markets by strategically reneging on forward commitments. We first study the behavior of a dominant firm in a two-period model with demand uncertainty. We then use the model's predictions and a machine learning approach to investigate multiple occurrences of reneging on long-term commitments in Alberta's electricity market in 2010-2011. We find that a supplier significantly increased its revenues by strategicall...
-
作者：Darmouni, Olivier; Aberg, Simon Essig; Tolvanen, Juha
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Rome Tor Vergata
摘要：Firms in decentralized markets often trade using quantity contracts, agreements specifying quantity prior to the point of sale. These contracts are valuable because they provide quantity assurance, as trading frictions could prevent a buyer and seller from matching in the spot market. However, quantity contracts prevent sellers from optimally allocating production across buyers after market conditions realize. Using proprietary invoice data, we estimate a model of quantity contracts in the pul...
-
作者：Liski, Matti; Vehvilainen, Iivo
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：Using micro-data on over 160 million bids to buy and sell from three major electricity markets, we study efficiency improvements resulting from technologies such as storage. Consumer benefits arise not from stabilized prices but from changes in general price levels. To unpack the findings, we develop a set of price-theory results, demonstrating that the convexity of market excess demand, derived from the bids, serves as a novel measure that strongly predicts consumer benefits across all market...
-
作者：Rey, Patrick; Spiegel, Yossi; Stahl, Konrad
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University; Leibniz Association; University of Mannheim; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We study the feasibility and profitability of predation in a dynamic environment, using a parsimonious infinite-horizon, complete information setting in which an incumbent repeatedly faces potential entry. When a rival enters, the incumbent chooses whether to accommodate or predate it; the entrant then decides whether to stay or exit. We show that there always exists a Markov perfect equilibrium, which can be of three types: accommodation, monopolization, and recurrent predation. We then analy...
-
作者：Tan, Teck Yong
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：I study the implications of data privacy when consumers' outside options are endogenously determined by their efforts. Data control refers to consumers' ability to opt out of data collection on their efforts. Data disclosure rate refers to the likelihood that the collected data are shared with a monopolist. I examine their differences and consider how their interplay affects welfare. Without data control, the data disclosure rate affects the monopolist's profit nonmonotonically but has no impa...
