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作者：Hinnosaar, Toomas
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：I study price setting within a network of interconnected monopolists. Some firms possess stronger commitment or bargaining power than others, enabling them to influence the pricing decisions of other firms. Although it is well-understood that multiple marginalization reduces both total profits and social welfare, I show that strategic interactions within the network exacerbate the marginalization problem. Individual profits are proportional to a new measure of network centrality, defined by th...
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作者：Yuan, Zhe; Barwick, Panle Jia
作者单位：Zhejiang University; University of Wisconsin System; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Wisconsin Madison; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：This article proposes an empirical framework and a novel equilibrium concept to analyze network competition in the airline industry. A two-stage entry model links direct and indirect flights, using a technological relationship estimated from data to mimic the hub-and-spoke network. It employs revealed-preference arguments to bound fixed cost parameters, estimated using state-of-the-art econometric methods. Ignoring network externality undervalues the benefits of additional flights by 13.2% and...
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作者：Li, Wenhao
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：This article studies a dynamic project-selection game between a Principal and an Agent with conflicting interests. Only the Agent knows what projects are feasible. In each period before a project is selected, the Principal imposes a restriction set. The Agent can select any feasible project within this set, thereby ending the game. The Agent can also stay silent, in which case the game will proceed to the next period. Importantly, the Principal cannot commit to her future restriction sets. I s...
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作者：Lyu, Qianjun
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：This article studies the optimal refund mechanism when an uninformed buyer learns about their valuation over time. We consider various refund mechanisms including simple return policies (no returns or free returns), and stochastic return policies, which allow the buyer to keep the product with some probability upon receiving a refund. We show that the optimal refund mechanism is deterministic and takes a simple form: either the seller deters buyer learning by offering a low price without retur...
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作者：Denicolo, Vincenzo; Polo, Michele
作者单位：University of Bologna; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We analyze a dynamic model of repeated innovation where inventors may either be acquired by an incumbent or else resist takeover and challenge for leadership. In the short run, acquisitions always spur innovation because of the invention-for-buyout effect. In the longer run, however, they may stifle it because of a countervailing effect, the entrenchment of monopoly. The latter occurs when the incumbent's dominance depends on past levels of activity and is therefore reinforced by recurrent acq...
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作者：Habermacher, Daniel
作者单位：Universidad de los Andes - Chile
摘要：We analyze authority allocation to incentivize information acquisition under interdependence. Agents access noisy signals about two states of the world. Beyond costs, acquisition depends on the expected influence on decisions, determined by whether authority is centralized or split among decision-makers. Restricting an agent's information on the extensive margin enhances communication. When such specialization is not feasible, informational congestion may induce similar incentive effects. Spli...
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作者：Chi, Chang Koo; Olsen, Trond E.
作者单位：Yonsei University; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：This article investigates contracts between two risk-neutral parties with bounded bonus payments. If the available signal about the agent's behavior satisfies a novel condition, the monotone likelihood ratio transformation property, the optimal contract takes a simple form irrespective of whether the first-order approach (FOA) is valid or not. The contract rewards the agent the maximum bonus if the signal's likelihood ratio exceeds a threshold, which in contrast to the FOA contract is not nece...
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作者：Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：A general mixture model of contests is introduced, combining stochastic performance and multivariate incomplete information. Performance is determined by a mixture distribution with endogenous weights on a good and bad distribution, respectively. Incomplete information does not increase the complexity of the problem, and actions are unambiguously strategic substitutes when technologies are homogeneous. These properties enable comparative statics with respect to changes in the type distribution...
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作者：Hsieh, Chih Sheng; Konig, Michael D.; Liu, Xiaodong
作者单位：National Taiwan University; Tinbergen Institute; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We introduce an R&D network formation model where firms choose both R&D efforts and collaboration partners. Neighbors in the network benefit from each other's R&D through technology spillovers, and there exists competition effects reflecting strategic substitutability in R&D. We provide a complete equilibrium characterization, and develop an estimation method that is computationally feasible for large networks. We then conduct an analysis of R&D collaboration subsidies, and find that a subsidy...
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作者：Domnisoru, Ciprian; Schiopu, Ioana
作者单位：Aalto University; Universitat Ramon Llull; Escuela Superior de Administracion y Direccion de Empresas (ESADE)
摘要：For-profit colleges have increased their share of the 4-year college market, particularly among nontraditional and online students, raising concerns about post-graduation outcomes. We set up and calibrate a general equilibrium model of college choice to analyze how for-profits compete with public and private nonprofit institutions. We quantify their response to changes in Pell Grant caps, public university subsidies, and gainful employment legislation linking federal funding to graduates' debt...
