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作者：Bisceglia, Michele; Piccolo, Salvatore
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Bergamo
摘要：We study a two-period industry where firms are run by agents privately informed about their (persistent) costs, and principals can only use spot contracts. We characterize novel semi-separating equilibria where principals randomize in one or both periods. These equilibria have the following implications for industry dynamics and firms' performance. First, despite some principals learning their agents' type early on, aggregate output need not increase over time: the inefficiencies generated by ...
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作者：Tan, Teck Yong
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：This article studies price discrimination by a seller who uses data on observables that buyers can control (or manipulate) at a cost. If the seller's discriminatory prices are offered covertly, equilibrium market segmentation is always coarse, resulting in limited price discrimination. In contrast, if prices must be transparently posted, every buyer pays a personalized price in equilibrium, though this does not always reduce buyer or social welfare. The analysis sheds new light on calls for tr...
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作者：Xiang, Jia
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：I estimate a Bayesian persuasion model to examine how financial incentives and asymmetric information shape physician-patient interactions. This approach offers new insights into the role of insurance. First, the model predicts that patients' coinsurance moderates physicians' responsiveness to increases in service fees. This prediction is supported by a difference-in-differences analysis using Chinese health insurance claims data with random variation in physicians' reimbursement and patients'...
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作者：Vollmer, Drew
摘要：In what circumstances is allowing resale more efficient than providing refunds? I study common aftermarket policies in perishable goods markets with demand uncertainty. Using primary and resale market data on college football ticket sales, I estimate a structural model comparing resale, which has flexible prices but incurs frictions, to a partial refund scheme, which is centralized but has rigid prices. In the model, consumers anticipate shocks when making initial purchases, then engage in res...
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作者：Li, Jing; Li, Shengyu; Zhang, Hongsong
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of New South Wales Sydney; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：Unobserved objective output quality complicates the analysis of firm productivity and demand because higher-quality products entail higher costs but offer greater consumption benefits. Using a panel of firms with output quality data, we decompose quantity-based productivity into fundamental productivity and the costs of quality, and separate the demand residual into fundamental demand and quality benefits. Fundamental demand accounts for most revenue variation, whereas quality's revenue-enhanc...
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作者：Balakin, Sergei; Roger, Guillaume
摘要：We study a long-horizon, oligopolistic market with random shocks to demand that can be arbitraged by two storage operators with finite capacity. This problem applies to any storable commodity-that is, most commodities. Because the arbitrage spread is so sensitive to market power, storage operators face strong incentives to restrain quantities by tacitly colluding. This cooperation takes new forms thanks to the multiplicity of actions they must take: selling, buying, or both. We construct payof...
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作者：D'annunzio, Anna; Russo, Antonio
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Mines-Telecom Business School
摘要：We study the pass-through of ad valorem taxes with a multiproduct monopolist. We characterize two mechanisms whereby an ad valorem tax on one good reduces all prices (Edgeworth's paradox), depending on the goods being substitutes or complements. We also find that the tax can increase the supply of all goods. Hence, consumer surplus and welfare can increase even when the goods are underprovided compared to the social optimum. We provide several applications where these results hold. Our finding...
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作者：Xu, Wenji; Yang, Kai Hao
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Yale University
摘要：This article examines the welfare implications of third-party informational intermediation. A seller sets the price of a product that is sold through an intermediary, who discloses information about the product to consumers. In a model where the intermediary is consumer-minded-has a payoff that depends on both the seller's revenue and the consumer surplus, we show that total welfare may decrease in the Pareto sense, as the intermediary's consumer-mindedness increases. Furthermore, we show that...
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作者：Bonnet, Celine; Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra; Molina, Hugo
作者单位：INRAE; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite Paris Saclay; INRAE; AgroParisTech
摘要：We develop a bilateral oligopoly framework with manufacturer-retailer bargaining to analyze the impact of retail mergers on market outcomes. We show that the surplus division between manufacturers and retailers depends on three bargaining forces and can be interpreted in terms of an equilibrium of fear. We estimate our framework in the French soft drink industry and find that retailers have greater bargaining power than manufacturers. Using counterfactual simulations, we highlight that retail ...
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作者：Nocke, Volker; Schutz, Nicolas
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：Using an aggregative games approach, we analyze horizontal mergers in a model of multiproduct-firm price competition with CES and logit demand, allowing for arbitrary firm and product heterogeneity. We provide conditions under which a merger raises consumer surplus, and establish the dynamic optimality of a myopic, consumer-surplus-based merger approval policy. We also study the aggregate surplus and external effects of a merger. Finally, we show that the market power effect of a merger, defin...
