Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Darmouni, Olivier; Aberg, Simon Essig; Tolvanen, Juha
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Rome Tor Vergata
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70068
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: long-term-contracts; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; search frictions; price dispersion; equilibrium; integration

摘要

Firms in decentralized markets often trade using quantity contracts, agreements specifying quantity prior to the point of sale. These contracts are valuable because they provide quantity assurance, as trading frictions could prevent a buyer and seller from matching in the spot market. However, quantity contracts prevent sellers from optimally allocating production across buyers after market conditions realize. Using proprietary invoice data, we estimate a model of quantity contracts in the pulp and paper industry. The average value of a quantity contract is 10% of profits, but would be 55% larger if sellers could optimally allocate production after market conditions realize.