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作者：Li, Hanzhe
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：How does the politician's reputation concern affect information provision when the information is endogenously provided by a biased lobbyist? I develop a model to study this problem and show that the answer depends on the transparency design. When the lobbyist's preference is publicly known, the politician's reputation concern induces the lobbyist to provide more information. When the lobbyist's preference is unknown, the politician's reputation concern may induce the lobbyist to provide less ...
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作者：Mohapatra, Debi Prasad; Zhang, Yang
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; Cornell University
摘要：We study the US Anti-Ulcer Drug market, where market exclusivity is granted to the first over-the-counter (OTC) drug independent of prescription drugs' patent expiry. We show that due to the interplay of incentives in the prescription and OTC drug markets, compared to a world with no market exclusivity policy, the status quo design reduces consumer welfare by 1.6 billion USD, as it causes many firms to delay entry into the OTC drug market until prescription drug patents expire. An alternative ...
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作者：Motta, Massimo; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study the market effects of sponsored search auctions for advertising space on searches for brands. In our model, firms simultaneously choose the price of their product and the bids for the advertising auctions triggered by their own and rivals' brand keywords search. In any symmetric equilibrium, each firm wins its own keyword auction, and relative to a no-ads benchmark, online advertising raises the winning brand's marginal cost and ultimately market prices. Only in an environment with st...
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作者：Ryan, Conor
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：In the presence of adverse selection, mergers can increase welfare through a reduction in inefficient sorting. I characterize the sorting externality internalized between merging firms in a tractable discrete choice model. Mergers benefit consumers when the firms are small, willingness to pay is moderately increasing in cost, and consumer costs are skewed. Applying the model to the non-group health insurance market, 13% of potential mergers would improve consumer surplus. In markets where the ...
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作者：Gil, Ricard; Houde, Jean-Francois; Sun, Shilong; Takahashi, Yuya
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：This article studies entry preemption in new industries. We first test a key prediction of dynamic entry games: Entry preemption is most relevant in intermediate-sized markets, where firms face highest uncertainty about future entry. Using US drive-in theater market (1945-1957) data, we find robust evidence for this non-monotonic relationship between market size and early entry probability. We then estimate a dynamic entry game, and quantify preemption effects through counterfactual analysis. ...
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作者：Cao, Yiran; Chen, Yongmin; Ding, Yucheng; Zhang, Tianle
作者单位：Jinan University; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Wuhan University; Lingnan University
摘要：We analyze a model where consumers sequentially search experts for treatment recommendations and prices, facing either zero or a positive search cost, whereas experts simultaneously compete in these two dimensions. In equilibrium, experts may cheat by overstating the severity of a consumer's problem and recommending an unnecessary treatment, prices follow distributions depending on the problem type and the treatment, and consumers employ Bayesian belief updating about their problem types durin...
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作者：Aridor, Guy
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Substitution patterns are a crucial input to antitrust analysis, but measuring them for free digital products has proved difficult due to the lack of price variation. I measure substitution patterns by installing software on experimental participants' Android phones that restricts access to Instagram or YouTube-generating variation in choice sets-and monitoring how participants reallocate their time. I find that participants substitute to multiple product categories in both restrictions but al...
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作者：Bobtcheff, Catherine; Levy, Raphael; Mariotti, Thomas
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Firms receiving independent signals on a common-value risky project compete to be the first to invest. When firms are symmetric and competition is winner-take-all, rents are fully dissipated in equilibrium and the extent to which signals are publicly disclosed is irrelevant for welfare. When disclosure of signals is asymmetric, welfare is highest when firms are most asymmetric, and policies that uniformly promote disclosure may backfire, especially when competition is severe. When firms strate...
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作者：Houde, Sebastien
作者单位：University of Lausanne
摘要：A coarse certification provides simple but incomplete information. Its rationale is to help consumers trade off dimensions of quality that are complex and lack salience. In imperfectly competitive markets, it may induce excess bunching at the certification requirement, crowd out quality, and facilitate price discrimination. Who will ultimately benefit from a coarse certification thus depends on the degree of market power firms can exercise as well as on consumers' sophistication in responding ...
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作者：Liu, Dongri; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：Shandong University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We adopt a dynamic mechanism design approach to study how a revenue-maximizing seller should sell an indivisible object when a buyer with a private value can search for an outside option with continuous-intensity choices. We find that lowering the buyer's search cost definitely reduces the seller's revenue when the buyer's search decision is binary, as in Armstrong and Zhou (2016). In contrast, with continuous search intensity, a counterintuitive effect may arise: lowering the buyer's search c...
