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作者：Lemus, Jorge; Marshall, Guillermo
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of British Columbia
摘要：Firms and government agencies increasingly use online contests to find solutions to problems. These contests allow players to make multiple attempts, and their progress is tracked on a real-time public leaderboard. Although the contests are dynamic, contest sponsors miss the opportunity to dynamically shape players' incentives, as they award the entire prize pool based only on players' final rankings. We propose the use of contingent prizes that depend on the game's history to incentivize play...
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作者：Duarte, Marco; Magnolfi, Lorenzo; Roncoroni, Camilla
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Warwick
摘要：Consumer cooperatives are firms owned by their customers. Although their organizational form should commit these firms not to exploit their market power, in practice, weak governance may allow managers to pursue other objectives. Using data and a structural model, we test whether consumer cooperatives in the Italian supermarket industry act as profit-maximizing firms. We find no significant deviations from profit maximization. Based on a counterfactual exercise, even a mild degree of internali...
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作者：Knutsen, Magnus Vage
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：I set up a dynamic experience goods model where a long-lived seller interacts with a sequence of short-lived buyers and where the seller has reputational concerns. The key innovation of the article is to endogenize prices in this framework, specifically by endowing either the seller or the buyers with the ability to post price. I show that influence over prices has a strong impact on equilibrium characteristics. If the seller posts price, equilibria will display work-shirk dynamics. If the buy...
