A Dynamic Model of Predation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rey, Patrick; Spiegel, Yossi; Stahl, Konrad
• 署名单位: Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University; Leibniz Association; University of Mannheim; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70027
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: learning-curve; COMPETITION; reputation; ANTITRUST; industry; entry; price

摘要

We study the feasibility and profitability of predation in a dynamic environment, using a parsimonious infinite-horizon, complete information setting in which an incumbent repeatedly faces potential entry. When a rival enters, the incumbent chooses whether to accommodate or predate it; the entrant then decides whether to stay or exit. We show that there always exists a Markov perfect equilibrium, which can be of three types: accommodation, monopolization, and recurrent predation. We then analyze and compare the welfare effects of different antitrust policies, accounting for the possibility that recurrent predation may be welfare improving.