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作者：Condorelli, Daniele; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：A platform matches a unit mass of sellers, each owning a single product of heterogeneous quality, to a unit mass of buyers with differing valuations for unit-quality. After matching, sellers make take-it-or-leave-it price-offers to buyers. Initially, valuations of buyers are only known to them and the platform, but sellers make inferences from the matching algorithm. The efficient matching is positive assortative, but buyer-optimal matchings are stochastically negative assortative when there a...
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作者：Martimort, David; Pouyet, Jerome
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CY Cergy Paris Universite; ESSEC Business School
摘要：Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on t...
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作者：Ellison, Glenn; Ellison, Sara Fisher
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Paris School of Economics
摘要：This article examines effects of internet search technologies on match-quality markets. A model in which sellers of unusual objects wait for high-value buyers illustrates how more efficient search may simultaneously increase price levels, price dispersion, and social welfare. A reduced-form analysis of the used-book market finds support for several nuanced model predictions. Estimates from a novel structural framework indicate the shift to online sales more than doubled social welfare, with ga...
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作者：Seim, Katja; Vitorino, Maria Ana
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; INSEAD Business School
摘要：This article empirically examines the drip pricing behavior of firms, where consumers purchase a base product and may later buy an add-on, often without anticipating the need for it. A loss leader pricing strategy emerges, with firms pricing the base product below, and the add-on above, standalone levels. Using data from the Portuguese driving instruction market, we find that base course prices decrease with competition, while prices for add-on repeat courses do not. A survey reveals that at l...
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作者：Beheshti, David; Neller, Seth
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
摘要：In this article, we examine the importance of individual physicians in explaining the significant variation in prescription drug spending in Medicare Part D. By tracking prescribing behavior before and after physician relocations, we find that movers' prescribing converges toward the average of their new location. However, this convergence is far from complete, highlighting the importance of idiosyncratic physician-specific factors. Overall, these physician-specific factors explain about 60 to...
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作者：Mukherjee, Arijit; Qi, Zijian; Vasconcelos, Luis
作者单位：Michigan State University; Texas Tech University System; Texas Tech University; University of Technology Sydney; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：When managers rely on their subordinates for local information but cannot commit to how such information is used, the incentives for effort and information elicitation become intertwined. This incentive problem influences the firm's job design decision, that is, whether to assign all tasks in a job to one worker (individual assignment) or split those among a group (team assignment). Team assignment facilitates information elicitation but suffers from diseconomies of scope in incentive provisio...
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作者：Rottner, Claudio
作者单位：University of Bayreuth
摘要：This article investigates a multi-unit pay-as-bid procurement auction where the auctioneer fixes total spending and maximizes the quantity procured with their predetermined, secret budget. Previous literature has analyzed fixed-quantity auctions, where the traded quantity is fixed but unknown to the bidders. Compared to such auctions, budget auctions lower the auctioneer's costs by introducing an additional interaction between a bidder's bids; bidders not only weigh a higher profit margin on a...
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作者：Peitz, Martin; Sato, Susumu
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We propose a tractable model of asymmetric platform oligopoly with logit demand in which users from two distinct groups are subject to within-group and cross-group network effects and decide which platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium when platforms manage user access by setting participation fees for each user group. We explore the effects of platform entry, a change of incumbent platforms' quality under free entry, and the degree of compatibility. We show how the analysis can be ...
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作者：Luo, Yao; Takahashi, Hidenori
作者单位：University of Toronto; Kyoto University
摘要：Procurement projects often involve substantial uncertainty in inputs at the time of contracting. Whether the procurer or contractor assumes such risk depends on the specific contractual agreement. We develop a model of auction contracts where bidders have multidimensional private information. Bidders balance skewed bidding and risk exposure; both efficient and inefficient bidders submit a low bid via skewed bidding. We document evidence of i) risk-balancing behavior through bid portfolio forma...
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作者：Hovenkamp, Erik; Lemus, Jorge; Turner, John L.
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Innovative product developers are often uninformed about relevant patents. Patentees may exploit this by strategically lurking-refraining from ex ante licensing in the hope that developers will unwittingly infringe, creating an opportunity for patent holdup. We contribute to the literature by introducing a framework to explore when strategic lurking is profitable and how it affects developers' technology decisions. We find that lurking is pervasive in equilibrium, and it may lead to inefficien...
