On the Optimality of Full Disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Catonini, Emiliano; Stepanov, Sergey
• 署名单位: New York University; NYU Shanghai; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70013
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: optimal information disclosure; persuasion; auctions

摘要

A privately informed sender can commit to any disclosure policy toward a receiver, whose actions affect the utility of the sender. We show that full disclosure is optimal under a sufficient condition with some desirable properties. First, it speaks directly to the parties' utility functions, as opposed to the sender's indirect utility function; this makes it easily interpretable and verifiable. Second, it does not require the sender's payoff to be a function of the posterior mean state. Third, it is weaker than the conditions obtained in the literature for some specific settings.