The Timing of New Technology Adoption: The Case of MRI

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70022
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: health-care; market-structure; Managed care; entry; COMPETITION; diffusion; preemption; equilibrium; ECONOMICS; ORDER

摘要

This paper studies the adoption of nuclear magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) by US hospitals. I consider a timing game of new technology adoption. The dynamic game takes timing decisions and strategic interaction into account. Using a panel data set of US hospitals, cross sectional variation in adoption times, market structure and demand is exploited to recover the profit and cost parameters. In counterfactuals, I quantify to what extent the timing of adoption is caused by a preemptive motive. I find a small but significant effect of preemptive motives, which are weakened by firm asymmetry.