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作者：Levin, D; Peck, J
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We consider a simultaneous-move, dynamic-entry game. The fixed cost of entry is private information. Entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist but also increases the likelihood of coordination failure and simultaneous entry. We consider general continuous distributions,for the fixed cost, and we characterize the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in pure strategies. Comparative-statics results are derived. As the time between rounds approaches zero, all of the acti...
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作者：Faure-Grimaud, A; Martimort, D
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse
摘要：Regulatory independence from political control enlarges the collusive opportunities between regulators and interest groups. This is costly for current politicians because deterring capture becomes harder. However, independence also constrains future governments. Whenever future and current governments have different preferences, independence creates a stabilization effect as both majorities find it more difficult to move policies toward their ideal points. Since deterring collusion links curre...
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作者：Gaynor, M; Vogt, WB
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We examine competition in the hospital industry, in particular the effect of ownership type (for-profit, not-for-profit, government). We estimate a structural model of demand and pricing in the hospital industry in California, then use the estimates to simulate the effect of a merger. California hospitals in 1995 faced an average price elasticity of demand of -4.85. Not-for-profit hospitals faced less elastic demand and acted as if they have lower marginal costs. Their prices were lower than t...
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作者：Vera-Hernández, M
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and obtain an approximation to the optimal contract. The results show that out-of-pocket payments follow a concave profile with respect to costs of treatment. I estimate the welfare loss due to moral hazard, taking into account income effects. I also propose a new measure of moral hazard based on the conditi...
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作者：Elfenbein, DW; Lerner, J
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We examine the structure of more than 100 alliances by Internet portals and other firms between 1995 to 1999 from a contract-theory perspective. Models of incomplete contracts frequently invoke unforeseen contingencies, the cost of writing contracts, and the cost of enforcing contracts in justifying the assumption of incompleteness. The setting in which Internet portals formed alliances was rife with these sorts of transaction costs. We argue that these alliances can be viewed as incomplete co...
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作者：Crocker, KJ; Moran, JR
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Syracuse University
摘要：Impediments to worker mobility serve to mitigate the attrition of healthy individuals from employer-sponsored insurance pools, thereby creating a de facto commitment mechanism that allows for more complete insurance of health risks than would be possible in the absence of such frictions.. Using data on health insurance contracts obtained from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, we find that the quantity of insurance provided is positively related to the degree of worker commitment. T...
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作者：Town, R; Liu, S
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We estimate the welfare associated with the Medicare HMO program, now known as Medicare+Choice (M+C). We find that the creation of the M+C program resulted in approximately $18.7 billion in consumer surplus and $52 billion in profits from 1993 to 2000 (in 2000 dollars). This program most likely generated significant net social welfare. However, we find that consumer surplus is geographically unevenly distributed. Prescription drug coverage accounts for approximately 45% of the estimated consum...
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作者：Pacheco-de-Almeida, G; Zemsky, P
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We show that time-to-build, which creates a lag between the decision to invest and production, is an important element of industry structure. We-study a multiperiod investment game where there is demand uncertainty. Adding time-to-build to the model alters the classic tradeoff between making strategic commitments and exploiting the option to wait. Furthermore, time-to-build gives rise to novel equilibria in which firms invest incrementally, which contrasts with most prior work on multiperiod i...
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作者：Spier, KE
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Many settlement contracts in litigation involving multiple plaintiffs (or multiple defendants) include most-favored-nation. (MFN) clauses. If an early settlement includes an MFN and the defendant settles later with another plaintiff for more money, the early settlers receive these terms too. If the defendant knows the aggregate distribution of expected awards but cannot discriminate among the Privately informed plaintiffs, then MFNs avoid costly delay. Plaintiffs with weak cases settle early r...
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作者：Crampes, C; Langinier, C
作者单位：Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); Iowa State University
摘要：A patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified. The patent holder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement. His reaction may be to go to court, to settle, or to accept entry. We investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision. In a simultaneous game, even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high, the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial...
