-
作者：Schmitz, PW
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：I discuss the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more effective. Should one agent be in control in both stages (integration), or should different agents be in charge of the two actions (separation)? Both modes of organization can be explained on the basis of incentive conside...
-
作者：Busse, M; Rysman, M
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University
摘要：We examine the effect of competition on second-degree price discrimination in display advertising in Yellow Pages directories. Our main empirical finding is that while competition is associated with lower prices, the association is not proportional along the range of product offerings. Instead, directories that face more competitors offer price schedules that display a greater degree of curvature than directories facing less competition. This means that purchasers of the largest ads pay less p...
-
作者：Cestone, G; Fumagalli, C
作者单位：University of Salerno; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We show that in business groups with efficient internal capital markets, resources may be channelled to either more- or less-profitable units. Depending on the amount of internal resources, a group may exit a market in response to increased competition, or channel funds to the subsidiary operating in that market. This has important implications for the strategic impact of group membership. Affiliation to a monopolistic subsidiary can make a cash-rich (poor) firm more (less) vulnerable to entry...
-
作者：Chen, KP; Chu, CYC
作者单位：National Taiwan University
摘要：We offer a formal model of corporate income tax evasion. While individual tax evasion is essentially a portfolio-selection problem, corporate income tax evasion is much more complicated. When the owner of a firm decides to evade taxes, not only does she risk being detected by the tax authorities, more importantly, the optimal compensation scheme offered to the employees will also be altered. Specifically, due to the illegal nature of tax evasion, the contract offered to the manager is necessar...
-
作者：Gonzalez, Xulia; Jaumandreu, Jordi; Pazo, Consuelo
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We explore the effects of subsidies by means of a model of firms' decisions about performing R&D when some government support can be expected. We estimate it with data on about 2,000 performing and nonperforming Spanish manufacturing firms. We compute the subsidies required to induce R&D spending, we detect the firms that would cease to perform R&D without subsidies, and assess the change in the privately financed effort. Results suggest that subsidies stimulate R&D and some firms would stop p...
-
作者：Arlen, J; MacLeod, WB
作者单位：New York University; Columbia University
摘要：We examine optimal individual and entity-level liability for negligence when expected accident costs depend on both the agent's level of expertise and the principal's level of authority. We consider these issues in the context of physician and managed care organization (MCO) liability for medical malpractice. Under current law, physicians generally are considered independent contractors and hence MCOs are not liable for negligent acts by physicians. We find that the practice of reviewing the m...
-
作者：Dessí, R
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse
摘要：I examine optimal financial contracts between entrepreneurs, financial intermediaries (venture capitalists), and other investors that allocate both cash flow rights and control rights to (i) motivate the venture capitalist to efficiently monitor the entrepreneur, (ii) ensure that the efficient decision is made at the interim stage concerning project continuation and refinancing, and (iii) deter collusion between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist at the expense of the other investors....
-
作者：Lyon, TP; Mayo, JW
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Georgetown University
摘要：Large sunk costs and incomplete regulatory contracts in public utilities create the Possibility of opportunistic behavior by either regulators or regulated firms. We present an empirical methodology for identifying opportunism within a regulated setting, and apply it to the large-scale cost disallowances levied by state regulators on electric utilities during the 1980s. Examining the investment propensity of all firms-both those that faced cost disallowances and those that did not-within parti...
-
作者：Lafontaine, F; Shaw, KL
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Franchisors simultaneously operate outlets under two distinct incentive schemes: franchising and company ownership. Using an extensive panel dataset, we show that experienced franchisors maintain a stable level of corporate ownership over time. However, the targeted rate of company ownership varies considerably across firms. We show that franchisors with high brand name value, measured by major media expenditures and other proxies, have high rates of company ownership. We argue that franchisor...
-
作者：Mialon, Hugo M.
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：The Fifth Amendment's due process clause requires the prosecution to share evidence with the defense, and the right to silence that it guarantees blocks the jury from drawing an adverse inference from a defendant's silence during trial. I examine the effect of the right to silence and the disclosure requirement on conviction rates and social welfare in an economic model of criminal trials. Many policy-relevant results emerge. The right to silence can improve welfare only if juries discriminate...
