Competition among hospitals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gaynor, M; Vogt, WB
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/1593787
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 764-785
• 关键词: american automobile-industry; nonprofit; mergers; demand; price; care

摘要

We examine competition in the hospital industry, in particular the effect of ownership type (for-profit, not-for-profit, government). We estimate a structural model of demand and pricing in the hospital industry in California, then use the estimates to simulate the effect of a merger. California hospitals in 1995 faced an average price elasticity of demand of -4.85. Not-for-profit hospitals faced less elastic demand and acted as if they have lower marginal costs. Their prices were lower than those of for-profits, but markups were higher. We simulate the effects of the 1997 merger of two hospital chains. In San Luis Obispo County, where the merger creates a near monopoly, prices rise by up to 53%, and the predicted price increase would not be substantially smaller were the chains not-for-profit.