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作者：Daughety, AF; Reinganum, JF
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：Most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses have been used to address a repeat player's time-inconsistency problem in. international trade, durable-goods monopoly pricing, franchise contracting, and settlement bargaining. We argue that a nonrepeat player (an early-bargaining plaint) can use an MFN to profitably modify the subsequent bargaining game between the defendant and a later-bargaining plaintiff. If an MFN is triggered (which. can happen in equilibrium), the early plaintiff receives an additional...
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作者：Arya, A; Mittendorf, B
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Yale University
摘要：We show that a manufacturer may prefer to offer a return policy when dealing with a retailer who holds advance knowledge about market conditions. Roughly stated, the manufacturer offers a liberal return allowance in. lieu of a lower price to satisfy a retailer facing unfavorable market conditions. A retailer facing favorable conditions finds this tradeoff unattractive because he is likely to sell the merchandise anyway and thus not make as much use of the generous return terms. As a consequenc...
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作者：Malcomson, JM
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Incentive contracts for gatekeepers who control patient access to specialist medical services provide too-weak incentives to investigate cost further when the expected cost of treatment is greater than the benefit. Making gatekeepers residual claimants with a fixed fee from which treatment costs must be met (as with full insurers who are themselves gatekeepers) provides too-strong incentives when the expected cost is less than the benefit. Giving patients the choice between a gatekeeper with a...
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作者：Gerlach, HA
作者单位：University of Auckland
摘要：I study the incentives of innovating firms to announce their entry in markets in which consumers incur a cost of switching from one product to another. Announcing entry can prevent the lock-in of potential demand before the launch of the new product. At the same time, however, the incumbent firm learns about the impending entry and has the opportunity to cut prices and preempt the market. In equilibrium, entrants do not always announce, and I show that this behavior maximizes ex ante total wel...
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作者：Bhaskar, V; To, T
作者单位：University of Essex; United States Department of Labor
摘要：We analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry. With a fixed number of firms, and in the absence of coordination failures, perfect price discrimination provides incentives for firms to choose product characteristics in a socially optimal way. However with free entry, the number of firms is always excessive. Our results apply to a large class of models of product differentiation. They also apply to models of common agency or lobbying with free entr...
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作者：Taylor, CR
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：I investigate consumer privacy and the market for customer information in electronic retailing. The value of customer information derives from the ability of Internet firms to identify individual consumers and charge them personalized prices. I study two settings, a confidential regime in which the sale of customer information is not possible, and a disclosure regime in which one firm may compile and sell a customer list to another firm that uses it to price discriminate. Welfare comparisons d...
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作者：Laffont, JJ; Marcus, S; Rey, P; Tirole, J
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a framework for Internet backbone competition. In the absence of direct payments between websites and consumers, the access charge allocates communication costs between websites and consumers and affects the volume of traffic. We analyze the impact of the access charge on competitive strategies in an unregulated retail environment. In a remarkably broad range of environments, operators set prices for their customers as if their customers' traffic were entirely off-net. We then compa...
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作者：Gutiérrez, M
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：I present a principal-agent model where the shareholders (principal) can take legal action against the director (agent). The court's decision provides a verifiable but costly and imperfect signal on the director's fulfilment of his fiduciary duties. The director's remuneration can be made contingent not only on performance but also upon the court's decision. 1 show that when damage awards are high enough, the widespread use of liability insurance and limited-liability provisions that is observ...
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作者：Crémer, J
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse
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作者：Tay, A
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital industry, where the choices of Medicare patients are unaffected by prices. Unlike previous studies that use geographic market concentration to estimate hospital competitiveness, this article emphasizes the importance of quality differentiation in this spatially differentiated market. I estimate a random-coefficients discrete-choice model that predicts patient flow to different hospitals and find that demand responses to both dista...
