To grab for the market or to bide one's time: a dynamic model of entry
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Levin, D; Peck, J
署名单位：
University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
DOI：
10.2307/1593745
发表日期：
2003
页码：
536-556
关键词：
摘要：
We consider a simultaneous-move, dynamic-entry game. The fixed cost of entry is private information. Entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist but also increases the likelihood of coordination failure and simultaneous entry. We consider general continuous distributions,for the fixed cost, and we characterize the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in pure strategies. Comparative-statics results are derived. As the time between rounds approaches zero, all of the action occurs during an arbitrarily small amount of time. For the Bertrand model, we extend the analysis to allow for n firms.
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