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作者：Klein, PG
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：This article challenges the conventional wisdom that the 1960s conglomerates were inefficient. I offer valuation results consistent with recent event-study evidence that markets typically rewarded diversifying acquisitions. Using new data, 1 compute industry-adjusted valuation, profitability, leverage, and investment ratios for 36 large, acquisitive conglomerates from 1966 to 1974. During the early 1970s, the conglomerates were less valuable and less profitable than stand-alone firms, favoring...
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作者：Athey, S; Schmutzler, A
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Zurich
摘要：We analyze a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment. Special cases include incremental investment, parent races, learning by doing, and network externalities, We investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through investments, To this end, we derive a new comparative statics result for general games with strategic substitutes, which applies to our investment game. Finally, we highlight plausible countervailing eff...
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作者：Kortum, S; Lerner, J
作者单位：Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：We examine the influence of venture capital on patented inventions in the United States across twenty industries over three decades. We address concerns about causality in several ways, including exploiting a 1979 policy shift that spurred venture capital fundraising. We find that increases in venture capital activity in an industry are associated with significantly higher patenting rates. While the ratio of venture capital to R&D averaged less than 3% from 1983-1992, our estimates suggest tha...
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作者：Nevo, A
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products. I discuss an alternative, which consists of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger. I estimate a brand-level demand system for ready-to-eat cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to (1) recover marginal costs, (2) simulate postmerger price equilibria, and (3) compute welfare effects...
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作者：Fudenberg, D; Tirole, J
作者单位：Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Firms sometimes try to poach the customers of their competitors by offering them inducements to switch. We analyze duopoly poaching under both short-term and longterm contracts assuming either that each consumer's brand preferences are fixed over rime or that preferences are independent over time. With fixed preferences, short-term contracts lead to poaching and socially inefficient switching. The equilibrium with long-term contracts has less switching than when only short-term contracts are f...
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作者：Suen, W
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：I offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets. The explanation does not rely on market power, strategic motives, or instability of the assignment mechanism. Uncertainty about workers' ability will produce inefficient matching if contracts are formed early. However, the insurance gain from early contracting may outweigh the loss from inefficient matching. If firms are risk neutral, it is the mediocre firms that will have the greatest incentive to of...
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作者：Jehiel, P; Moldovanu, B
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Mannheim
摘要：We study an auction whose outcome influences the future interaction among agents. The impact of that interaction on agent i is assumed to be a function of all agents' types (which are private information at the time of the auction). Explicit illustrations treat auctions of patents and takeover contests. We derive equilibria for second-price, sealed-bid auctions in which the seller sometimes keeps the object, and we point out the various effects caused by positive and negative impacts. We also ...
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作者：Conlin, M
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I empirically test for a separating equilibrium in the bargaining context of National Football League (NFL) contract negotiations. The separating equilibrium predicts that a player who delays contractual agreement signs a more lucrative contract and has positive private information on his ability level at the time of contract negotiations. These predictions are tested using data on 1,873 players selected in the 1986 through 1991 NFL drafts. The empirical results support the implications of the...
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作者：Scotchmer, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The patent system is mainly a renewal system: the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees. I ask whether such a system cart be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research. In such a model I show that renewal mechanisms (possibly with subsidies) are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on, regardless of the objective function. Under plausible circumstances, patents should have a uniform life, rather than varying i...
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作者：Lamont, O; Stein, JC
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We use city-level data to analyze the relationship between homeowner borrowing patterns and house-price dynamics. Our principal finding is that in cities were a greater fraction of homeowners are highly leveraged-i.e., have high loan-to-value ratios-house prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks, such as changes in per-capita income. This finding is consistent with recent theories that emphasize the role of borrowing in shaping the behavior of asset prices.
