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作者：Toivanen, O; Waterson, M
作者单位：University of Helsinki; University of Warwick
摘要：We study the effects of market structure on entry using data from the U.K.. fast food (counterservice burger) industry over the years 1991-1995, for which the market can be characterized as a duopoly. We use both reduced-form estimations and a structural model, controlling for market-specific time-invariant unobservables. For both firms, we find that market structure matters greatly. Specifically, rival presence increases the probability of entry by increasing expected market size, whereas var...
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作者：Levy, G
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：I analyze how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court's decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the law properly and allows the evaluator to assess the judge's ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evalu...
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作者：de Fontenay, CC; Gans, JS
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：We analyze vertical integration to compare outcomes under upstream competition and monopoly. This is done in a model based on the property rights approach to firm boundaries and where multilateral negotiations are modelled using a fully specified, noncooperative bargaining game. We demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoff of integrating parties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstre...
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作者：Shavell, S
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Minimum asset and liability insurance requirements must often be met in order for parties to participate in potentially harmful activities. Such financial responsibility requirements may improve parties' decisions whether to engage in harmful activities and, if so, their efforts to reduce risk. However, the requirements may undesirably prevent some parties with low assets from engaging in activities. Liability insurance requirements tend to improve incentives to reduce risk when insurers can o...
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作者：Kim, J; Marschke, G
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：We develop and test a model of the patenting and R&D decisions of all innovating firm whose scientist-employees sometimes quit to join or start a rival. In our model, the innovating firm patents to protect itself from its employees. We show theoretically that the risk of a scientist's departure reduces the firm's R&D expenditures and raises its propensity to patent an innovation. We find evidence from firm-level panel data that is consistent with this latter result. Our results suggest that sc...
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作者：Beresteanu, Arie
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Using data on local exchange carriers (LECs), I estimate the total cost function of LECs operating between 1988 and 1995. First, I show that cost complementarities can be nonparametrically identified in many situations where economies of scope and subadditivity-the focus of previous empirical research-cannot be identified. Next, I implement a feasible nonparametric estimation model restricting the cost function to satisfy properties required by economic theory. The results support the assumpti...
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作者：Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew; Viswanathan, S.
作者单位：Columbia University; Duke University
摘要：In many auctions, bidders do not have enough cash to pay their bid. If bidders have asymmetric cash positions and independent private values, then auctions will be inefficient. However, what happens if bidders have access to financial markets? We characterize efficient auctions and show that in an efficient auction the information rent that a bidder earns depends generally on both his valuation and his cash position. In contrast, a competitive capital market that is efficient must have informa...
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作者：Adner, R; Zemsky, P
摘要：We formalize the phenomenon of disruptive technologies that initially serve isolated market niches and, as they mature, alter industry boundaries by displacing established technologies from mainstream segments. Using a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation, we show how the threat of disruption depends on rates of technological advance, how many firms use each technology, relative market segment sizes, and firms' ability to price discriminate. We characterize the effect of disruption...
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作者：Thomadsen, Raphael
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：I analyze how ownership structure and market geography jointly influence fast food prices. I estimate a model of demand and supply that accounts for the market geography and run counterfactual experiments that demonstrate how mergers affect prices. I find that the impact of mergers can be large, that this impact decreases as the merging outlets are farther apart, that mergers among market leaders generally increase prices more than mergers among weaker firms, and that mergers can increase pric...
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作者：Compte, O; Lambert-Mogiliansky, A; Verdier, T
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：We investigate the effect of corruption on competition in procurement. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e., the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide an opportunity for bid readjusments in exchange for a bribe. As firms expect to be paying a bribe, a mechanical effect of corruption is to increase the contract price by an amount corresponding to the anticipated bribe. We show, however, that a key effect of corruption is to facilitate collusion in price between firm...
