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作者：Spiegel, Y; Spulber, DF
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：The regulated firm's choice of capital structure is affected by countervailing incentives: the firm wishes to signal high value to capital markets to boost its market value while also signalling high cost to regulators to induce rate increases, When the firm's investment is large, countervailing incentives lead both high- and low-cost firms to choose the same capital structure in equilibrium, thus decoupling capital structure from private information, When investment is small or medium-sized, ...
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作者：Mezzetti, C
摘要：I analyze a common agency relationship where the agent has private information about the difference in his value for two principals. When the principals independently offer incentive contracts, the agent specializes less than is socially efficient, but more than when they cooperate and choose the contract that maximizes their joint payoff Under both arrangements the agent faces countervailing incentives. The pooling region of types receiving a flat fee is larger and the incentive pay of the re...
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作者：Sutton, J
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：I propose an equilibrium concept for a class of games in which players make irreversible costly decisions; these games have been widely used in the recent Industrial Organization literature. The equilibrium concept is defined not in the space of strategies, but in the space of (observable) outcomes. It is weaker than perfect Nash equilibrium, and it involves combining a form of survivor principle with an assumption about entry. This assumption involves only a very weak rationality requirement:...
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作者：Branco, F
作者单位：Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
摘要：Procurement auctions usually require the bid to specify several characteristics of the contract to be fulfilled. In this article I study the design of such mechanisms, allowing for a special case of correlation on the firm's costs. I describe the properties of optimal mechanisms and study the design of multidimensional auctions. Contrary to the independent-costs model, to implement the optimal outcome the procurer will need to use a two-stage auction: in the first stage the procurer selects on...
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作者：Kim, JH
摘要：The literature on excess entry shows that the free-entry equilibrium number of firms may be greater than is socially optimal, and proposes government entry regulation as a remedy, This article tries to show that such a policy recommendation is misleading. A two-period, three-person entry game model, which explicitly includes second-best government, shows that entry regulation aimed at preventing excess entry actually induces the incumbent to behave strategically against the government and make...
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作者：Adams, JD; Jaffe, AB
作者单位：Brandeis University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We find that the effects of parent firm R&D on plant-level productivity are diminished by both the geographic and technological distance between the research lab and the plants; that productivity appears to depend on R&D per plant rather than the total amount; and that spillovers from technologically related firms are significant but also depend on R&D intensity rather than total industry R&D. These results suggest that the ''dilution'' of R&D across multiple target plants reduces its potency ...
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作者：Verboven, F
作者单位：KU Leuven
摘要：Why are car prices so different across European countries? I construct and estimate an oligopoly model to analyze whether international price discrimination can explain the puzzle. Three sources of international price discrimination are considered: price elasticities, import quota constraints, and collusion. The data reveal that international price discrimination accounts for an important part of the observed price differences. Low price elasticities (or domestic market power) are present in F...
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作者：Jehiel, P; Moldovanu, B
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：We study a model that involves identity-dependent, asymmetric negative external effects. Willingness to pay, which can be computed only in equilibrium, will reflect, besides private valuations, also preemptive incentives stemming from the desire to minimize the negative externalities. We find that the best strategy of some agents is simply not to participate in the market, although they cannot in this way avoid the negative external effects. An illustration is made for the acquisition of paten...
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作者：Moore, MJ
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article analyzes the effect of tobacco excise tax changes on mortality. Reduced-form regressions of mortality rates on tobacco taxes for the years 1954-1988, with controls for state, year, income, alcoholic beverage taxes, age distribution, and unobserved health trends indicate that tax increases lead to statistically significant decreases in smoking-related mortality. Evidence on the complementary relationship between alcohol and tobacco as it relates to health outcomes is also presented...
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作者：Klette, TJ
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：This article presents an alternative specification of knowledge production and derives a structural econometric model with some desirable properties. I provide a simple and less data-intensive framework for empirical studies of the relationship between firm performance and R&D. The main empirical finding are as follows: (i) R&D has a positive effect on performance, (ii) the appropriable part of knowledge capital depreciates at a rate of,2, (iii) there are significant spillover effects of R&D a...
