Litigation and settlement in patent infringement cases

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Crampes, C; Langinier, C
• 署名单位: Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); Iowa State University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/3087433
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 258-274
• 关键词: information

摘要

A patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified. The patent holder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement. His reaction may be to go to court, to settle, or to accept entry. We investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision. In a simultaneous game, even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high, the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial. The likelihood of entry may increase with the penalty, In sequential games, regardless who plays first, entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game.