Structural estimation of a principal-agent model:: moral hazard in medical insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vera-Hernández, M
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/1593783
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 670-693
• 关键词: excess health-insurance; payroll records; welfare loss; access value; care; demand; uncertainty; RISK; ECONOMICS; deductibles

摘要

Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and obtain an approximation to the optimal contract. The results show that out-of-pocket payments follow a concave profile with respect to costs of treatment. I estimate the welfare loss due to moral hazard, taking into account income effects. I also propose a new measure of moral hazard based on the conditional correlation between contractible and noncontractible variables.