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作者：Chu, Leon Yang; Sappington, David E. M.
作者单位：University of Southern California; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We characterize the optimal contract between a principal and a risk-neutral, wealth-constrained agent when an adverse selection problem follows a moral hazard problem. The optimal contract in this setting often is more steeply sloped for the largest output levels than is the optimal contract in either the standard moral hazard setting or the standard adverse selection setting. The large incremental rewards for exceptional performance motivate the agent to deliver substantial effort both before...
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作者：Chakravarty, Surajeet; MacLeod, W. Bentley
作者单位：University of Exeter; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations based on verifiable events (corresponding to the legal rule of specific performance). As a matter of law, this is not the case. This leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies used by the courts. This article shows that American standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an efficient mechanism for implementing building projects given existing legal rules. It is shown th...
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作者：Hazlett, Thomas W.; Munoz, Roberto E.
作者单位：George Mason University; Universidad Tecnica Federico Santa Maria
摘要：Economic analysis of spectrum policy focuses on government revenues derived via competitive bidding for licenses. Auctions generating high bids are identified as successful and those with lower receipts as fiascoes. Yet spectrum policies that create rents impose social costs. Most obviously, rules favoring monopoly predictably increase license values but reduce welfare. This article attempts to shift analytical focus to efficiency in output markets. In performance metrics derived by comparing ...
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作者：Streb, Jochen
作者单位：University Hohenheim
摘要：This article examines the determinants of contractual form and renegotiations in the German construction industry during the Third Reich. At the beginning of World War II, firms dealt with growing uncertainty by convincing procurement agencies either to use cost-plus contracts or to include an additional risk premium in fixed-price contracts. In the later years of the war, procurement agencies initiated renegotiations over contract clauses to reduce the extraordinary profits resulting from inf...
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作者：Innes, Robert; Hamilton, Stephen F.
作者单位：University of Arizona; California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo
摘要：This article considers vertical restraints in a setting in which duopoly retailers each sell more than one manufactured good. Vertical restraints by a dominant manufacturer enable the firm to acquire horizontal control over a competitively supplied retail good. The equilibrium contracts produce symptoms that are consistent with a variety of observed retail practices, including slotting fees paid to retailers by competitive suppliers, loss leadership, and predatory accommodation with below-cost...
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作者：Sweeting, Andrew
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Commercial radio stations and advertisers may have conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This article estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available. It finds that stations want to play their commercials at the same time, suggesting that stations' incentives are at least partially aligned with th...
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作者：Galeotti, Andrea; Goyal, Sanjeev
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Cambridge
摘要：The growth of the Internet and assorted technologies has made it possible to collect and process detailed information on social networks. This article investigates how firms (and governments) can harness the power of social networks to promote their goals. We show that the optimal use of social networks leads to higher sales and greater profits. However, an increase in the level and dispersion of social interaction can increase or decrease the optimal influence strategy and profits of the play...
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作者：Prasad, Suraj
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：I develop an agency model of job assignments where jobs differ based on the breadth of tasks. A tradeoff between task complementarities and relative abilities of workers results in those with balanced skills being assigned to multitask jobs. The same tradeoff between complementarities and relative abilities also influences incentives to sort privately informed workers to jobs. I then draw on a variety of sources (survey data, case studies, and anecdotal evidence) to suggest that relative abili...
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作者：Kumar, Praveen; Langberg, Nisan
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：Inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud, where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors' beliefs, has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention. We reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets, building on shareholder-manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets. Because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof, the optimal re...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; Renault, Regis
作者单位：University of Virginia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：Improved consumer information about horizontal aspects of products of similar quality leads to better consumer matching but also to higher prices, so consumer surplus can go up or down, while profits rise. With enough quality asymmetry, though, the higher-quality (and hence larger) firm's price falls with more information, so both effects benefit consumers. This occurs when comparative advertising is used against a large firm by a small one. Comparative advertising, as it imparts more informat...
