The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bourjade, Sylvain; Jullien, Bruno
• 署名单位: Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); Universite de Toulouse; TBS Education; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00146.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 575-594
• 关键词: information; disclosure; collusion; news

摘要

We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preferences for the status quo. Surprisingly, revealing the intensity of the expert's bias does not always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a second expert raises the first expert's incentives to report truthfully when the market can identify the contribution of each expert, but reduces them when only the collective contribution is identified by the market.