Bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tang, Xun
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00130.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 175-203
• 关键词: 1st-price auctions; entry

摘要

Measuring auction revenues under counterfactual reserve prices or formats requires knowledge of distributions of bidders' values and private signals. This poses a challenge when bids are observed from first-price, common-value auctions. I bound counterfactual revenue distributions without imposing parametric restrictions on the model structure. Using data from U.S. municipal bond auctions, I find first-price and second-price auctions under optimal reserve prices lead to little improvement in revenues over existing first-price formats. The number of bidders has a more significant impact on revenues in optimal auctions. I also find invoking an incorrect assumption of private values in counterfactual analyses results in small errors in predicting revenues from optimal second-price auctions.