A dynamic model of lawsuit joinder and settlement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00142.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 471-494
• 关键词: class-action suits; LITIGATION

摘要

We model the dynamic process wherein two privately informed plaintiffs may file and combine related lawsuits in order to lower trial costs and/or improve the likelihood of winning. The equilibrium resembles a bandwagon: some plaintiff types file early, whereas others wait and only file suit if they observe a previous filing. Finally, some plaintiff types never file and some early filers drop their suits if not joined by another plaintiff. We then consider the effect of allowing preemptive settlement offers by the defendant aimed at discouraging follow-on suits. Preemptive settlement results in a gold rush of cases into the first period.