Regulatory enforcement with competitive endogenous audit mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gilpatric, Scott M.; Vossler, Christian A.; McKee, Michael
• 署名单位: University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00134.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 292-312
• 关键词: tax compliance; tournaments; leverage; incentives; penalties

摘要

This article adds to the regulatory compliance literature through the theoretical development and experimental testing of two endogenous audit mechanisms that use contemporaneous relative comparisons, based on disclosed information or imperfect signals of compliance effort, to generate a compliance competition among agents. This type of audit mechanism has some advantages over the more widely studied dynamic audit mechanisms that condition an agent's audit probability on past compliance, and provides an alternative explanation for the stylized fact, in many settings, that most agents are compliant most of the time even though audit rates and expected penalties are low.