Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhattacharya, Sourav; Mukherjee, Arijit
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Michigan State University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12029
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 522-544
• 关键词: multiple referrals; implementation; debate; rules

摘要

We consider a persuasion game between a decision-maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identified by two parameters: (i) quality or his likelihood of observing the state (i.e., learning what the best decision is) and (ii) agenda or the preferred decision that is independent of the state. An informed expert may feign ignorance but cannot misreport. We offer a general characterization of the equilibrium. From the decision-maker's standpoint, (a) higher quality is not necessarily better, (b) extreme agendas are always preferred, and (c) the optimal panel may involve experts with identical (rather than conflicting) agendas.