Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
• 署名单位: University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12010
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 56-74
• 关键词: incomplete contracts; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; COSTS; benefits; privatization; OWNERSHIP; management; GOVERNMENT; provision; services

摘要

A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate private contractors. The two provision modes differ in their incentives to innovate and to gather private information about future costs to adapt the service provision to changing circumstances. The government agency's preferred mode of provision depends on the information-gathering costs, the costs of innovation efforts, and the degree to which effort is contractible.