Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fukuda, Emiko; Kamijo, Yoshio; Takeuchi, Ai; Masui, Michiharu; Funaki, Yukihiko
• 署名单位: National Defense Academy - Japan; Kochi University Technology; Ritsumeikan University; Waseda University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12026
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 438-461
• 关键词: bidder behavior; 2nd-price

摘要

Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid their true values. In the theoretical investigation, by applying the locally envy-free Nash equilibrium to the VCG, we found that the allocations are efficient and that upper and lower bounds of the auctioneer's revenue coincide in the two mechanisms. A laboratory experiment, in which the revenues and efficiencies were similar in both mechanisms, supported this result.