Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, Edward J.; Holmberg, Paer; Philpott, Andrew B.
• 署名单位: University of Sydney; University of Auckland
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12008
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1-32
• 关键词: electricity spot market; price-setting firms; equilibria; uncertainty; COMPETITION; EXISTENCE; uniform; games

摘要

We introduce the concept of an offer distribution function to analyze randomized offer curves in multiunit procurement auctions. We characterize mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for pay-as-bid auctions where demand is uncertain and costs are common knowledge, a setting for which pure-strategy supply function equilibria typically do not exist. We generalize previous results on mixtures over horizontal offers as in Bertrand-Edgeworth games and also characterize novel mixtures over partly increasing supply functions. We show that the randomization can cause considerable production inefficiencies.