China's land market auctions: evidence of corruption?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J. Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua
• 署名单位: Peking University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12028
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 488-521
• 关键词: selection; procurement; COMPETITION

摘要

In China, urban land is allocated by leasehold sales by local officials. Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or two-stage auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials. Two-stage auctions have a first stage where favored developers signal that auctions are taken, deterring entry of other bidders. Empirics show that both sales prices and competition are significantly less for two-stage than English auctions. Selection on unobserved property characteristics is positive: officials divert hotter properties to two-stage auctions.