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作者：FABELLA, RV
摘要：We show that the Pareto superiority of loan repayment in kind within a tied credit arrangement to a cash-for-cash scheme under uncertain output price depends crucially on the farmer loan demand elasticity and his risk aversion. For the risk-neutral trader, the cash-for-cash scheme is shown to be Pareto dominated by credit tying and the price premium he offers depends on farmer loan demand elasticity.
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作者：STERN, N
摘要：This paper considers problems and issues that arise when we attempt to extend the static theory of taxation and production planning to a dynamic context and to combine that theory with theories of growth. The reasons dynamic theory is less developed include problems with the analytical tractability of even those dynamic models which attempt to retain the basic structure of the static model. Furthermore, difficult and interesting issues arise in a dynamic context which are either not present or...
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作者：ROTHSTEIN, P
摘要：State grants-in-aid modify the full fiscal income and tax price for education services faced by voters in local school districts. If aid is non-linear in the local property tax rate, as occurs with District Power Equalization coupled with an aid floor, then individual budget constraints are non-linear and least squares estimation is inappropriate. We develop and estimate a model that incorporates these effects, derive and extensively illustrate the comparative statics, present global and local...
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作者：CUBITT, RP
摘要：The claim that economic policy precommitment is advantageous is investigated in a context in which the welfare basis of the government's objectives is explicit. Three results are demonstrated, each one defining a class of welfare functions and a class of models such that precommitment would not raise welfare in models of that class. It is concluded that, if a purely welfare economic argument for precommitment is to be found, attention will have to be paid either to conflicts, asymmetries and d...
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作者：ROEMER, JE; SILVESTRE, J
摘要：The cost function of a monopoly is C(q) = K + theta-q, where theta is unknown to the regulator. We evaluate various ownership and regulation regimes in terms of social welfare, determined by both the amount of total surplus and its distribution. Maximal welfare is achieved by the regulated public firm when its bias is pro-consumer, and also when it is pro-worker and theta is low enough. We compare an unregulated public firm with a private one regulated a la Loeb-Magat-Baron-Myerson and charact...
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作者：BAGNOLI, M; BENDAVID, S; MCKEE, M
作者单位：University of New Mexico
摘要：This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test the predictions of a model of voluntary provision of public goods through private contributions. The particular voluntary contribution game implements the core in successively undominated perfect equilibria, but the behavioral question is whether the agents adopt strategies which support this refinement to the Nash equilibrium. The experimental evidence suggests that they do not: core allocations do not consistently occ...
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作者：TRANDEL, GA
摘要：A use tax is similar to a sales tax, except that it is imposed on purchases made from out-of-state firms. Historically, the use tax has been widely evaded. This paper uses a spatial model to analyze the welfare effects of such evasion. The analysis shows that the ability of consumers to evade the use tax alters their behavior in a way that leads firms to charge lower prices. This reduces the welfare loss created by the sellers' market power, and implies that evasion can increase welfare, even ...
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作者：ZODROW, GR
摘要：This paper analyzes grandfather rules (GR) within the context of the 'optimal tax reform' problem and a reform that eliminates differential capital taxation. Two general conclusions are suggested. First, GR can be a very effective reform implementation tool. Appropriately structured GR can convert potential 'losers' from reform into gainers so that the reform becomes Pareto-improving; alternatively, GR can often be used to distribute the pins from reform more equitably. Second, GR should never...
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作者：ALM, J; MCCLELLAND, GH; SCHULZE, WD
摘要：Why do people pay taxes when they have an opportunity, even an incentive, to evade? The experimental results in this paper suggest that tax compliance occurs because some individuals overweight the low probability of audit, although such overweighting is not universal. The results also indicate that compliance does not occur simply because individuals believe that evasion is wrong, since subject behavior is unchanged by the use of either neutral or loaded terms. Finally, there is evidence that...
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作者：STERN, N
