ECONOMIC-POLICY PRECOMMITMENT AND SOCIAL-WELFARE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
CUBITT, RP
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90019-C
发表日期：
1992
页码：
191-201
关键词：
摘要：
The claim that economic policy precommitment is advantageous is investigated in a context in which the welfare basis of the government's objectives is explicit. Three results are demonstrated, each one defining a class of welfare functions and a class of models such that precommitment would not raise welfare in models of that class. It is concluded that, if a purely welfare economic argument for precommitment is to be found, attention will have to be paid either to conflicts, asymmetries and differences within the private sector, or to multiple equilibria.
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