A WELFARE COMPARISON OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC MONOPOLY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
ROEMER, JE; SILVESTRE, J
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90042-E
发表日期：
1992
页码：
67-81
关键词：
摘要：
The cost function of a monopoly is C(q) = K + theta-q, where theta is unknown to the regulator. We evaluate various ownership and regulation regimes in terms of social welfare, determined by both the amount of total surplus and its distribution. Maximal welfare is achieved by the regulated public firm when its bias is pro-consumer, and also when it is pro-worker and theta is low enough. We compare an unregulated public firm with a private one regulated a la Loeb-Magat-Baron-Myerson and characterize the frontier, in parameter space, where one or the other dominates.
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