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作者：DELIPALLA, S; KEEN, M
作者单位：University of Essex; Swansea University
摘要：This paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly, with and without free entry. Predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price, high tax revenue and (when entry is precluded) low profits. Ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective: the set of circumstances under which (with free entry) specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare-improving, and in bo...
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作者：BESLEY, T; COATE, S
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Princeton University
摘要：Welfare stigma is widely regarded to be of central importance in understanding the impact of welfare programs in their goal of alleviating poverty. It affects both the decision to take up benefits and the well-being of those who actually do. This paper develops alternative models of the determinants of welfare stigma. We identify two views: a statistical discrimination approach and a taxpayer resentment view. We discuss how each may be formalized and derive their implications. We then examine ...
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作者：AUERBACH, AJ; HASSETT, K
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：This paper derives and estimates models of nonresidential investment behavior in which current and future tax conditions directly affect the incentive to invest. The estimates suggest that taxes have played an independent role in affecting postwar U.S. investment behavior, particularly for investment in machinery and equipment. In addition, the paper develops a method for assessing the impact of tax policy on the volatility of investment when such policy is endogenous. Illustrative calculation...
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作者：DAVIES, JB; KUHN, P
作者单位：McMaster University; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：Recently, several authors have argued that social security can have positive effects on savings and welfare when individuals possess hidden information about their longevity, that is when there is adverse selection in annuity markets. This paper considers the related problem of the effects of social security when individuals can take hidden actions to affect their longevity, that is when there is moral hazard in annuity markets. In contrast to the adverse-selection models, we show that social ...
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作者：ROMER, T; ROSENTHAL, H; MUNLEY, VG
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Lehigh University
摘要：Allocation of resources in the local public sector involves economic and political forces. In many U.S. states the bulk of spending on public education is subject to referendum. We link spending proposals to referendum outcomes. Our model makes use of voting data to shed light on the extent to which referenda constrain spending. We use data from school budget referenda in 544 New York school districts for the 1975-1976 school year. Our econometric results and simulations based on them reveal c...
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作者：BASU, K; BHATTACHARYA, S; MISHRA, A
摘要：Existing models of corruption that allow for bribery have ignored an important recursive problem. When an auditor or a policeman bargains over a bribe with a person he has arrested, he has to take into account the fact that he may, in turn, be caught for taking this bribe and be involved in a similar bargain, but from the other side. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model for capturing this recursion. Having done so, it goes on to analyse some conditions for the control of corr...
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作者：HEADY, CJ; MITRA, PK
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：This paper analyses commodity taxes in an economy where some production is centrally planned, and subject to price controls, and some is market determined. It shows that backward shifting of taxes can lead to significant distributional effects, and demonstrates how these lead to the modification of tax rules. The implications of these modifications are analysed using a numerical model based on Chinese data. Significant non-uniformity of tax rates is shown to be desirable in a case where standa...
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作者：CROCKER, KJ; SNOW, A
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：When agents possess imperfect hidden knowledge at the time contracts are negotiated, the social value of agents having access to additional hidden knowledge before contracts are implemented is positive to the extent that incentive-constrained agents are sorted more finely, but is negative to the extent that incentive-constraining agents impose more stringent signalling requirements on others. Hence, the intuition developed by Hirshleifer (1971), Marshall (1974), and Milgrom and Stokey (1982), ...
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作者：IWAMOTO, Y
摘要：This paper clarifies the relation between the average and marginal effective tax rates using the notion of the change in Tobin's average q. The equation connecting the effective rates shows that corporate taxation can be represented by a mixture of two extreme tax rules; one being a distorting pure corporate tax and the other a nondistorting cash flow tax. The paper proposes new measures representing this feature.
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作者：AMIEL, Y; COWELL, FA
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We reconsider some of the basic assumptions of the literature on inequality analysis. Students' views on the meaning of inequality comparisons were elicited by means of a questionnaire involving both numerical and verbal questions. The responses suggest that two important axioms the principle of transfers and decomposability are not universally accepted.
