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作者：HENDERSHOTT, PH; WON, YH
摘要：Portfolio-based general equilibrium models are useful for analyzing the interaction between the structure of individual tax rates and the way particular assets are taxed, for considering the role of differential tax rules and risk in determining household portfolio choices, and for addressing distributional questions. Unfortunately, current versions of these models give housing short shrift, owner housing is assumed to be riskless, rental housing is not a separately identifiable asset, and ten...
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作者：MITRA, PK
摘要：This paper develops the theory of design and reform of protective tariffs in a revenue-constrained small open economy characterized by learning-by-doing. It shows that revenue-raising requires wedges between consumer prices and shadow prices while protection, when typically not achievable via subsidies directly targeted towards factor market distortions, requires wedges between producer prices and shadow prices. Illustrative calculations in a modestly disaggregated general equilibrium model of...
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作者：DOWNS, TW
摘要：A growing body of literature analyzes the variation in Q, the ratio of financial market value to asset current replacement cost, and makes inferences about attributes such as monopoly power, profitability, managerial performance, etc. These studies ignore potential biases embedded in Q that result from non-neutral tax policies. This study examines the association between Q and tax biases and establishes that differences in accumulated depreciation tax shields explain significant variation in Q...
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作者：KEMP, MC; VANLONG, N
作者单位：McGill University; Australian National University
摘要：It is argued that in strictly egalitarian economies, there is an equilibrium in which social well-being is maximized and that this is so whatever the nature of returns to scale and whether or not the economy is characterized by elements of monopoly, externalities of consumption or production, commodity taxes or subsidies, or the private provision of public goods. As a corollary, the implications of distortions and increasing returns can be effectively studied only in a context of inequality.
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作者：ANDREONI, J
摘要：This paper considers a simple dynamic model of tax compliance in which people may face binding borrowing constraints. The model leads to much different conclusions and policy recommendations than static models. In particular, the government cannot generate full compliance by setting the expected value of cheating to be negative. Also, it is possible for the government to set penalties in a way that will increase tax revenue over that of full compliance. The government can increase welfare by p...
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作者：SUMNER, M
摘要：The effects of three pre-announced changes in fiscal policy on manufacturing investment in equipment and in industrial buildings are estimated using the Engel-Granger two-step procedure. The strong seasonal variation in the expenditure series is interpreted as an economic process within the same framework.
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作者：HUIZINGA, H
摘要：This paper investigates the tax treatment by national governments of R&D expenditures of multinational enterprises. In a noncooperative world, the international tax system is generally shown to discourage R&D investments by multinational firms. For the special case of symmetric corporate tax rates, the multinational is allowed to expense less than the total of its R&D expenses worldwide. Internationalization of the firm's operations and ownership is demonstrated to lead to less generous expens...
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作者：CHANDER, P; WILDE, L
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We extend the game-theoretic model of Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) to allow for corruption in tax administration. In the presence of corruption audit rates are generally higher than in its absence. In fact, in the presence of corruption it is possible to sustain equilibria in which all returns are audited. Moreover, when some auditors accept bribes it is possible for increases in the fine rate or the tax rate to reduce expected government revenue.
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作者：IHORI, T
摘要：This paper extends previous models of non-cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing for impure public goods. The analysis is developed in the context of international public goods. Under certain conditions the consequences of transfers on utility are paradoxical. If the preferences are divergent, a country may gain by giving a transfer, the receiver may lose, and these two phenomena may appear at the same time.
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作者：BOADWAY, R; BRUCE, N
摘要：This paper analyzes income tax integration in a small open economy when agents exploit all legal tax arbitrage opportunities. The analysis shows that integration does not accomplish the objectives that have been attributed to it. Instead of eliminating the double taxation of equity income, it simply removes the primary taxation of savings done through the corporation. The analysis has implications for the choice of a personal tax base and for the design of the corporate tax.
