VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC-GOODS - THE MULTIPLE UNIT CASE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BAGNOLI, M; BENDAVID, S; MCKEE, M
署名单位：
University of New Mexico
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90006-2
发表日期：
1992
页码：
85-106
关键词：
摘要：
This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test the predictions of a model of voluntary provision of public goods through private contributions. The particular voluntary contribution game implements the core in successively undominated perfect equilibria, but the behavioral question is whether the agents adopt strategies which support this refinement to the Nash equilibrium. The experimental evidence suggests that they do not: core allocations do not consistently occur in the laboratory markets.
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