Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alva, Samson; Manjunath, Vikram
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; University of Ottawa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.004
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 121-142
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; Pareto-improvement; Pareto-constrained participation-maximality; school choice; Pivotal mechanism

摘要

We consider a model where each agent has an outside option of privately known value. At a given allocation, we call the set of agents who do not exercise their outside options the participants. We show that one strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism weakly Pareto-improves another if and only if, at each preference profile, it weakly expands (in terms of set inclusion) the set of participants. Corollaries include: a sufficient condition for a mechanism to be on the Pareto-efficient frontier of strategy-proof mechanisms; uniqueness of strategy-proof Pareto-improvements under true preferences over certain normatively meaningful benchmark allocation rules; and a characterization of the pivotal mechanism. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.